Kev’s Column: The Shadow of Iraq
Every week Kevin publishes his very own “Kev’s Column” online. This week he takes a look at the latest situation in Iraq.
Once again the TV screens are full of images of death and destruction from Iraq, yet this time it is not a re-run of footage from the Iraq War, or of the insurgency faced by our own forces, it is something much more sinister.
The rapid advance of ISIS, a splinter group that broke away from Al-Qaeda, has brought a frightening image of Iraq potentially imploding into civil war just as Syria did in 2011. The capture of major cities and a potential march on the capital, Baghdad, shows ISIS has become a force to be reckoned with.
When US and British forces left Iraq much was made of the work that had been done to build up an Iraqi Army and Police force to take over security. Yet faced with an army of insurgents these forces appear to have melted away, leaving behind their equipment and weaponry for their enemy to collect. The insurgents even managed to seize millions of dollars from looting banks in Mosul that will only add to the threat they pose.
Like many I was prepared to support the Iraq War on the basis of the evidence the then Government put forward. This included claims of weapons of mass destruction being held and the fact that for over a decade Saddam Hussein had ignored various UN Resolutions, with the resulting sanctions creating a terrible situation in the country itself. These claims turned out to be exaggerated at best.
The Iraq War itself in 2003 was the expected walk over with much of Saddam’s forces disappearing rather than fight. Yet from the fall of Baghdad it was clear that little thought had been given to what next. What would an Iraq after Saddam look like? The answer was a naïve belief that a new state could quickly be created with a democratic government elected to lead it in due course. This approach was epitomised by the American authorities sending 363 tonnes of cash ($12bn) into the country and just watching it disappear.
The most fundamental mistake was to ignore the tribal and sectarian rifts in the country that would quickly be exposed once Saddam’s repressive regime was removed. This was followed by the almost inexplicable decision to immediately disband the Iraqi Armed Forces and Police, rather than change their command and use them to keep order. Instead foreign forces had to keep order whilst a new force was built up from scratch, helping to further create an image of occupation.
Lord Mountbatten in an interview filmed as part of the World at War documentary series explained how he coped with the massive challenge of suddenly being in charge of large swathes of South East Asia when the Japanese surrendered at the end of World War II. He talks about how he used the Japanese Army to keep order, pending the restoration of legitimate governments able to raise their own forces and retake command. 60 years later the American Authorities who took over in Iraq would have done well to learn from the memoirs of those who in the 1940s faced a similar challenge in Germany and Asia.
The current Iraqi Government is supported by our Government and it does have some legitimacy in the form of an election having been held. That said the campaign for votes may have helped fuel some of the grievances that are being used as a justification by some in the country for supporting the insurgency. In supporting the Iraqi Government the UK and US have what might seem a surprising ally, Iran.
Iran’s interests are clear once their normal hostility towards the US and UK are put to one side. The last thing Iran’s rulers want is a Sunni fundamentalist state on their borders threatening a repeat of the Iraq/Iran War that created such horror in the 1980s or breeding internal revolt. This explains why they have sent troops from their Revolutionary Guard to fight on the side of the Iraqi Government, although it creates an uncomfortable similarity to their support for President Assad in Syria for those nations which have called for that Government to go.
I believe there is no role for Britain’s military getting involved in this conflict. Western forces on the ground would only heighten the insurgency and could see us bogged down in another long running conflict with unclear aims and no clear goal to achieve. Even if there was a potential benefit to our involvement could we really send our forces to fight alongside the Revolutionary Guard of Iran?
The wider regional implications of sectarian conflict spreading from Syria to Iraq are ones that must concern us. Saudi Arabia provides a large percentage of the world’s total energy supplies and more radicalised regimes in Syria and Iraq could again threaten the security of Israel. The west should use diplomacy where it can and offer what support is needed, with the exception of military intervention.
When we talk about the Iraq War many focus on the shadow it left politically in this country, not least for Tony Blair and his followers. Some cite David Miliband’s vote for the war as the reason his Brother Ed was able to pip him to the job of Labour Leader in 2010. Yet the real shadow is the one that is now over the Middle East.
The history of the Iraq War makes any intervention difficult because the public are rightly sceptical. Likewise the belief on the ground is that it will probably makes things worse, not better, in the long run as the western nations will focus not on building a stable country, but securing resources for their own economies.
We cannot just ignore parts of the world falling into conflict, but on this occasion the regional powers are the ones who need to take the lead in restoring stability. A western force will not have the same effect as this is not a traditional battle between two armies like the Gulf War was. We cannot be the World’s Policeman.
Saudi Arabia has modern armed forces, with much of their equipment having been made in the UK, so is able to prevent the spread of conflict into its borders. Likewise Iran has forces that are relatively modern, hence why there has been so much fear of what their intentions may be in future, not least in relation to Nuclear Weapons. The choices they both make will be critical.
In this instance there is no prospect of an ideal outcome, what we can hope for is that some element of calm will be returned that allows a more peaceful future for Iraq’s people who have suffered so much already. The issue for any attempt by the west to help deliver this is that the shadow of the Iraq War is very long.